Others beat me to it, but yes, KKR ended up paying dearly for this one.For context, KKR is one of the largest private equity firms in...
Others beat me to it, but yes, KKR ended up paying dearly for this one.
For context, KKR is one of the largest private equity firms in the world, has been around for 50 years, and has done thousands of deals.
Based on my quick-and-dirty research into publicly documented deals, this looks like one of KKR's biggest losses in absolute dollars, potentially among its five worst (ever!)
Expanding the comparison to the entire private equity industry, I'd rank it around the ~20th worst deal ever. Especially when you consider the speed in which this one went belly up. I could go dig and figure out what fund it was in to see what IRR its kicked off (depending on if that is public)
Yeah...heads probably rolled. But then again, you'd be surprised how that sometimes works.
There will be (if not already) many dissertations on the effects the covid-era boom and bust cycle. Much of the research I've come across is dated enough that it excludes the outcomes of the last 2-3 years.
Others beat me to it, but yes, KKR ended up paying dearly for this one.For context, KKR is one of the largest private equity firms in...
Others beat me to it, but yes, KKR ended up paying dearly for this one.
For context, KKR is one of the largest private equity firms in the world, has been around for 50 years, and has done thousands of deals.
Based on my quick-and-dirty research into publicly documented deals, this looks like one of KKR's biggest losses in absolute dollars, potentially among its five worst (ever!)
Expanding the comparison to the entire private equity industry, I'd rank it around the ~20th worst deal ever. Especially when you consider the speed in which this one went belly up. I could go dig and figure out what fund it was in to see what IRR its kicked off (depending on if that is public)
Yeah...heads probably rolled. But then again, you'd be surprised how that sometimes works.
There will be (if not already) many dissertations on the effects the covid-era boom and bust cycle. Much of the research I've come across is dated...
There will be (if not already) many dissertations on the effects the covid-era boom and bust cycle. Much of the research I've come across is dated enough that it excludes the outcomes of the last 2-3 years.
From an academic perspective, it's not particularly unique. It's just another boom bust that we've seen many many times before in a lot of industries.
The interesting part is measuring permeant changes (or lack of) in spending patterns due to the lockdowns and increased leisure and experience driven spending.
Others beat me to it, but yes, KKR ended up paying dearly for this one.For context, KKR is one of the largest private equity firms in...
Others beat me to it, but yes, KKR ended up paying dearly for this one.
For context, KKR is one of the largest private equity firms in the world, has been around for 50 years, and has done thousands of deals.
Based on my quick-and-dirty research into publicly documented deals, this looks like one of KKR's biggest losses in absolute dollars, potentially among its five worst (ever!)
Expanding the comparison to the entire private equity industry, I'd rank it around the ~20th worst deal ever. Especially when you consider the speed in which this one went belly up. I could go dig and figure out what fund it was in to see what IRR its kicked off (depending on if that is public)
Yeah...heads probably rolled. But then again, you'd be surprised how that sometimes works.
There will be (if not already) many dissertations on the effects the covid-era boom and bust cycle. Much of the research I've come across is dated...
There will be (if not already) many dissertations on the effects the covid-era boom and bust cycle. Much of the research I've come across is dated enough that it excludes the outcomes of the last 2-3 years.
From an academic perspective, it's not particularly unique. It's just another boom bust that we've seen many many times before in a lot of industries. The interesting...
From an academic perspective, it's not particularly unique. It's just another boom bust that we've seen many many times before in a lot of industries.
The interesting part is measuring permeant changes (or lack of) in spending patterns due to the lockdowns and increased leisure and experience driven spending.
To your point, the mountain bike industry has weathered the dot-com bubble, the Great Financial Crisis, and now COVID.
I agree that COVID was different, largely because it fundamentally changed consumer behavior and pushed people toward new hobbies and activities. What's more nuanced, however, is just how many headwinds have emerged in its wake.
It's not simply an oversupply problem caused by pulling demand forward, nor is it the result of any single macroeconomic event. It's a combination of supply chain disruptions, the end of more than a decade of artificially low interest rates, slowing technological innovation in the industry, and now an AI boom that's reshaping capital markets and putting additional upward pressure on rates (who wants to invest in bikes, these days?).
Meanwhile, the middle class continues to face pressure on wages, purchasing power, and upward mobility. Put all of that together, and you have an outdoor industry facing a pretty difficult structural environment, one that feels markedly different from the growth we saw in the '90s, 2000s, and 2010s.
At least that's my read. Admittedly, some of that is based on vibes rather than hard data.
There will be (if not already) many dissertations on the effects the covid-era boom and bust cycle. Much of the research I've come across is dated enough that it excludes the outcomes of the last 2-3 years.
From an academic perspective, it's not particularly unique. It's just another boom bust that we've seen many many times before in a lot of industries.
The interesting part is measuring permeant changes (or lack of) in spending patterns due to the lockdowns and increased leisure and experience driven spending.
To your point, the mountain bike industry has weathered the dot-com bubble, the Great Financial Crisis, and now COVID.
I agree that COVID was different, largely because it fundamentally changed consumer behavior and pushed people toward new hobbies and activities. What's more nuanced, however, is just how many headwinds have emerged in its wake.
It's not simply an oversupply problem caused by pulling demand forward, nor is it the result of any single macroeconomic event. It's a combination of supply chain disruptions, the end of more than a decade of artificially low interest rates, slowing technological innovation in the industry, and now an AI boom that's reshaping capital markets and putting additional upward pressure on rates (who wants to invest in bikes, these days?).
Meanwhile, the middle class continues to face pressure on wages, purchasing power, and upward mobility. Put all of that together, and you have an outdoor industry facing a pretty difficult structural environment, one that feels markedly different from the growth we saw in the '90s, 2000s, and 2010s.
At least that's my read. Admittedly, some of that is based on vibes rather than hard data.
Looks like Ghost is no longer toast as the same company that acquired Winora and Haibike from Accel will also be taking over Ghost.
Yeah the IP is "saved", but not a single employee retained their job
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